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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the key to the centrist Civic Platform’s victory in the 2011 Polish 
parliamentary election, the first by an incumbent governing party in post-communist Poland, 
was its ability to generate fear about the possible consequences of the right-wing Law and 
Justice party returning to power. Although many of Civic Platform’s supporters were 
disappointed with its slow progress in modernising the country, most voters viewed the party 
as the better guarantor of stability at a time of crisis and continued to harbour deeply 
ingrained concerns about the main opposition party. The election appeared to provide 
further evidence of the consolidation and stabilisation of the Polish party system around the 
Civic Platform-Law and Justice divide. However, other factors pointed to the dangers of 
declaring that the Polish party system was ‘frozen’ around these two political blocs and 
suggested that it remained vulnerable to further shocks and re-alignments. This was 
exemplified by the breakthrough of the Palikot Movement in this election which was able to 
mobilise a constituency that went beyond the existing anti-clerical electorate and represented 
a genuinely new phenomenon in Polish politics; although it was questionable whether, given 
its potential structural weaknesses and limitations of its appeal, this new party would be the 
long-term beneficiary of any revival on the Polish left. 
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The October 2011 Polish parliamentary election saw a clear victory for the centrist Civic 
Platform (Platforma Obywatelska: PO) party, which thus became the first incumbent 
governing party to secure re-election for a second term of office since the collapse of 
communism in 1989, while the right-wing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS) 
party came a strong but fairly distant second. The agrarian Polish Peasant Party (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe: PSL) held on to its share of the vote, giving the governing coalition a 
small but workable majority in the new parliament. The Palikot Movement (Ruch Palikota: 
RP), a new anti-clerical liberal party, emerged as the third largest grouping in the new Sejm, 
the more powerful lower house of parliament, overtaking the once-powerful communist 
successor party the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: SLD) which 
suffered its worst ever election defeat. 
 
This paper examines the 2011 Polish parliamentary election and its possible significance for 
the future development of the Polish party system. It begins by looking at the background and 
context to the election, surveying the main developments in the Polish party system in the 
2007-11 parliament. Section two examines the election campaign before section three moves 
on to briefly analyse the election results. Finally, section four looks at what, if any, lessons 
can be drawn from this election about the long-term trajectory of Polish politics, particularly: 
whether it confirmed the emergence of a stable Polish party system consolidated around a bi-
polar division between the two big electoral blocs; and what were the future prospects for the 
Polish left? 
 
The paper argues that the key to the Civic Platform’s victory in the 2011 election was its 
ability to generate fear about the possible consequences of Law and Justice returning to 
power. Although many of the party’s supporters were disappointed with its slow progress in 
modernising the country, most voters viewed Civic Platform as the better guarantor of 
stability at a time of crisis and continued to harbour deeply ingrained concerns about Law and 
Justice. The election appeared to provide further evidence of the consolidation and 
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stabilisation of the Polish party system around the Civic Platform-Law and Justice divide. 
However, other factors pointed to the dangers of declaring that the Polish party system was 
‘frozen’ around these two blocs and suggested that it remained vulnerable to further shocks 
and re-alignments. This was exemplified by the breakthrough of the Palikot Movement in this 
election which was able to mobilise a constituency that went beyond the existing anti-clerical 
electorate and represented a genuinely new phenomenon in Polish politics, although it was 
questionable whether, given its potential structural weaknesses and limitations of its appeal, 
this new party would be the long-term beneficiary of any revival on the Polish left. 
 
Polish party development in the 2007-11 parliament 
 
During the 2007-11 parliament the Polish political scene was very stable with support for the 
four main parties remaining fairly constant. As Figure 1 shows, the two parties that won the 
largest share of the vote in the 2007 parliamentary election
1
 remained dominant: Civic 
Platform, the main governing party led by prime minister Donald Tusk, and Law and Justice, 
the main opposition grouping led by Jarosław Kaczyński, Mr Tusk's predecessor as prime 
minister. However, Civic Platform retained a substantial lead and continued to enjoy the 
steady support of around 40-50% of the electorate. This was an extraordinarily high level for 
a governing party and nearly twice that recorded by Law and Justice, its closest rival which 
remained stuck at around 20-30%. Civic Platform even managed to emerge un-scathed from a 
major lobbying and corruption scandal following allegations by the central anti-corruption 
bureau (Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne: CBA) in September 2009 that senior ministers and 
party leaders had acted covertly on behalf of the gambling industry to block legislation that 
would have increased betting taxes. Although the ‘gambling affair’ forced Mr Tusk to 
dismiss and side-line some of his closest aides, it had no apparent impact on the party’s 
support.
2
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 For more on the 2007 election, see: R. Markowski, ‘The 2007 Polish Parliamentary Election: Some 
Structuring, Still a Lot of Chaos’, West European Politics, Vol 31 No 5, September 2008, pp1055-1068; and A. 
Szczerbiak, ‘The Birth of a Bipolar Party System or Referendum on a Polarising Government: The October 
2007 Polish Parliamentary Election’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol 24 No 3, 
September 2008, pp415-443. 
2
 See: N. Maliszewski, ‘To już koniec afery hazardowej’, 21 February 2010, http://www.polskatimes.pl/ 
(Accessed 22 February 2010); and P. Śmiłowicz, ‘Koniec ery afer’, Newsweek, 14 March 2010. 
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Figure 1: Patterns of support for the four main Polish parties, 2007-11 
 
 
 
Source: CBOS, Preferencje partyjne we wrześniu, CBOS: Warsaw, September 2011, p2 
 
 
This was a remarkable and unprecedented record in Polish politics which was more 
accustomed to the rise and disappearance of governing parties. Although the nature of 
popular support for the government was often very shallow, Mr Tusk’s administration 
generally had more declared supporters than opponents and throughout the period the prime 
minister remained one of Poland’s most popular politicians. Polish voters clearly warmed to 
his apparently consensual style compared to that of Mr Kaczyński, his more combative 
predecessor. For example, a January 2011 CBOS survey found that 40% of respondents felt 
that the Tusk government had improved the lives of Polish citizens, compared to only 25% 
who felt that about the previous Law and Justice administration.
3
 A June 2011 GfK Polonia 
survey also found that, although only 22% felt positively about the Civic Platform-led 
government and 34% evaluated it negatively (40% were neutral); this compared with the 74% 
who felt negatively about its Law and Justice-led predecessor at the end of its term of office.
4
 
Civic Platform and Law and Justice thus had an apparent ‘lock’ on the Polish electorate and 
within that duopoly Mr Tusk's party appeared to have an in-built majority.  
                                                          
3
 See: CBOS, Reformować czy zarządzać - Polacy o strategii oraz kompetencji rządu i opozycji, March 2011 
(January 2011 data), CBOS: Warsaw, pp10-11. 
4
 See: E. Olczyk and J. Stróżyk, ‘Premier słabnie, ale wciąż mocny’, Rzeczpospolita, 18-19 June 2011. 
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As Figure 1 shows, opinion polls also showed the Democratic Left Alliance, the smaller left-
wing opposition grouping, third with around 10-15% support. The Alliance had previously 
been one of the strongest parties in Poland and governed from 1993-97 and 2001-5 but was in 
the doldrums since its support collapsed in the 2005 parliamentary election following its 
involvement in a series of spectacular high level corruption scandals.
5
 National polls often 
showed the Peasant Party, Civic Platform’s junior coalition partner in government, struggling 
to secure the 5% vote share required to obtain parliamentary representation. However, the 
party more than held its own in the October-November 2010 regional assembly elections 
when it came third with over 16% of the vote nationally.
6
 
 
The Civic Platform-Peasant Party coalition was much more cohesive than most of its 
predecessors; indeed, this was probably one of the most stable governments in post-1989 
Poland. The key to its stability was the political partnership between Mr Tusk and Peasant 
Party leader Waldemar Pawlak, who held the office of deputy prime minister and economy 
minister. The two leaders were generally able to defuse tensions and problematic issues 
before they became too contentious or escalated into major public disputes. This was helped 
by the fact that the Peasant Party was primarily an office-seeking party with a clearly defined 
rural-agricultural electoral constituency, making it a pragmatic negotiating partner with a 
fairly narrow policy agenda. For example, a May 2011 CBOS survey found that by far the 
most important reason cited by Peasant Party voters for supporting the party (by 46% of 
respondents) was the fact that it represented and defended the interests of people like 
themselves; other parties’ voters rarely if ever cited this as a reason.7 Importantly, the fact 
that the two parties had somewhat different core electorates and bases of support, with the 
Civic Platform primarily an urban party and the Peasant Party’s voters drawn mainly from 
rural communities, meant that they were not in direct competition for the same voters. The 
Peasant Party also appeared to have drawn lessons from earlier periods as a member of 
coalition governments during the 1990s and early 2000s when it was a very difficult partner 
and distanced itself publicly from the main ruling party whenever its poll ratings declined or 
the government encountered difficulties. However, this time around Mr Pawlak’s party 
                                                          
5
 See: A. Szczerbiak, ‘”Social Poland” Defeats “Liberal Poland”: The September-October 2005 Polish 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol 23 No 2, 
June 2007, pp203-232 . 
6
 See: J. Stróżyk, ‘Platforma wygrała, ale to PSL świętuje’, Rzeczpospolita, 25 November 2010. 
7
 See: CBOS. Oczekiwania i motywacje wyborcza Polaków, July 2011 (May 2011 data), CBOS: Warsaw, p3. 
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pursued a very different strategy: making a virtue of its predictability and self-consciously 
trying to project an image as a constructive and moderating force in Polish politics.
8
 At the 
same time, it concentrated on ‘delivering’ for its core rural-agricultural electorate both in 
terms of policy - by, for example, protecting the heavily state-subsidised farmers social 
security system - and through its control of government-appointed posts and agencies, 
especially in the agricultural sector.
9
 As long as Civic Platform was careful not to push ahead 
too quickly with policy reforms that threatened to undermine the interests of the Peasant 
Party’s core farming constituency, or on other issues where it felt that it might not have been 
able to count on its partner’s support, then the coalition functioned smoothly. 
 
Nonetheless, Civic Platform’s support was shallow and not based on any particular 
enthusiasm for the government or its policies. For sure, Mr Tusk’s administration was 
generally felt to have done a competent job and took credit for ensuring that Poland was the 
only EU member that came through the first wave of the global financial crisis in 2008-9 
without falling into recession. However, although Civic Platform had made a bold campaign 
pledge in the 2007 election that it would deliver an ‘economic miracle’, fearing the political 
consequences Mr Tusk’s government failed to capitalise on its electoral mandate and move 
ahead quickly with the more radical social and economic policy reforms that were advocated 
by many analysts as necessary for the party to live up to its promises. As a consequence, the 
government was heavily criticised, even by its own supporters, for its lack of major 
achievements and ambition.
10
 This led to a steady erosion in the government’s public 
approval ratings and satisfaction with its performance. For example, a January 2011 CBOS 
survey found that 72% of respondents felt that the government had failed to implement its 
election promises, 69% did not trust government information on important political and 
economic matters, 66% felt that it avoided difficult decisions and 60% that it avoided 
tackling the most important issues facing the country.
11
 Similarly, a June 2011 CBOS survey 
found that while most Poles considered Mr Tusk to be likeable (65%), intelligent (62%), 
                                                          
8
 See: M. Strąk, ‘Długi marsz PSL’, 20 June 2008, www.gazeta.pl (Accessed 23 June 2008). 
9
 See: K. Naszkowska, ‘Psy szczekają, karawana PSL idzie dalej’, 7 May 2008, www.gazeta.pl (Accessed 8 
May 2008). 
10
 See, for example: J. Paradowska, ‘Antysalonowiec’, Polityka, 9 October 2010; W. Gadomski, ‘Fani odeszli 
od Tuska’, 15 February, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 18 February 2011); M. Szułdrzyński, ‘Gdy piar przestaje 
działać…’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 February 2011; M. Janicki and W. Władyka, ‘Bunt elit’, Polityka, 19 February 
2011; R. Kalukin, ‘Cholernie ciężko popreć Platformę’, 22 Feburary 2011, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 24 
February 2011); Ł. Warzecha, ‘Platforma odczarowana’, Rzeczpospolita, 24 February 2011; and R. Krasowski, 
‘Premier, który sie boi’, Rzeczpospolita, 30 March 2011. Cf: J. Kucharcyzk, ‘Liberalizm w wersji 
pragmatycznej’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 April 2011. 
11
 See: Reformować czy zarządzać, pp6, 8 and 9. 
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dynamic (61%), hard-working (47%) and competent (45%), they also felt that he had not 
fulfilled their expectations. This could be seen clearly in the fall, compared with his first year 
in office, in the number who felt that the prime minister was decisive (from 57% to 37%), 
confronted difficult issues (from 50% to 33%), was consistent and determined (from 48% to 
28%), and delivered on his promises (from 35% to 17%).
12
 
 
In its defence, the government’s supporters argued that, initially at least, it was hugely 
constrained by the fact that it had to ‘co-habit’ with President Lech Kaczyński, the Law and 
Justice party leader’s twin brother. Given his very close links with Law and Justice, Mr 
Kaczyński quickly emerged as a natural focus for opposition and found himself in a perpetual 
and debilitating conflict with the government.
13
 Although he had few executive prerogatives, 
Mr Kaczyński could veto legislation and on a number of occasions refused to sign key 
elements of the government’s programme. 14  The government lacked the three-fifths 
parliamentary majority in the Sejm required to over-turn the presidential veto and therefore 
needed the support of the Democratic Left Alliance in key votes to secure it. This became 
more difficult when, at the party’s June 2008 congress, Grzegorz Napieralski defeated the 
incumbent Wojciech Olejniczak in a close and divisive leadership contest. While Mr 
Olejniczak, along with most of the party’s best known leaders, had favoured co-operating 
with the government against Law and Justice, Mr Napieralski adopted a new political strategy 
based on making fewer concessions to, and distancing his party from, the Tusk 
administration.
15
 
 
However, in April 2010 President Kaczyński and 95 others, including many senior Polish 
officials and public figures, died in a plane crash at Smolensk in western Russia on their way 
to a memorial service honouring the thousands of Polish officers killed by the Soviet NKVD 
secret police in the Katyn forest in 1940. Mr Kaczyński’s untimely death and the subsequent 
election of Bronisław Komorowski, a Civic Platform nominee, as President in July 201016 
removed an important constitutional obstacle to the implementation of the government’s 
                                                          
12
 See: CBOS, Portret Donalda Tuska po ponad trzech latach sprwowania urzędu premiera, July 2011 (June 
2011 data), CBOS: Warsaw, pp2, 5. 
13
 See: K. Kik, ‘PiS – partia destrukcyjnego czynu’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 July 2008. 
14
 See: M. Janicki and W. Władyka, ‘Mniejszościowy rząd większości’, Polityka, 17 May 2008. 
15
 See: C. Łazarewicz, ‘Zapateralski’, Polityka, 31 May 2008. 
16
 For more on the 2010 election, see: Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Europe and the June/July 2010 Polish Presidential 
Election’, European Parties Elections and Referendums Network Election Briefing No 55, August 2010, 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-election-briefing-no-55.pdf; and J. Rosset, ‘The 2010 presidential 
election in Poland’, Electoral Studies, Vol 30 No 1, January 2011, pp223-244.  
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programme and left Mr Tusk’s party controlling all the main organs of state power. 
Nonetheless, with a parliamentary election scheduled for autumn 2011, the government still 
remained instinctively cautious of introducing radical reforms that might alienate voters. The 
Peasant Party’s presence as a junior coalition partner also acted as a block on the introduction 
of certain reforms. However, Civic Platform’s reluctance to accelerate reforms was also part 
of its broader governing philosophy which tried to turn programmatic timidity and 
ideological eclecticism into a virtue.
17
 Civic Platform’s approach of ‘reform by small steps’ 
was integral to the its long-term strategy of transforming itself from an economically liberal 
and socially conservative centre-right party into a non-ideological and all-inclusive centrist 
grouping that was attractive to a very wide spectrum of voters; what some critics dubbed a 
‘post-political’ party of power.18 
 
In fact, rather than any particular enthusiasm for Mr Tusk’s government or its programme, 
Civic Platform’s greatest electoral asset was the public’s continued aversion to the turbulent 
and often emotionally charged style of politics that most Poles associated with the 2005-7 
Law and Justice-led governments and Jarosław Kaczyński in particular.19 For example, a 
February 2009 PBS DGA survey found that 36% of Civic Platform voters admitted that one 
of the main reasons why they supported their party was fear of Law and Justice returning to 
power.
20
 Similarly, a June-July 2011 CBOS survey found that by far the largest number of 
respondents (47%) said that they would definitely not vote for Law and Justice compared 
with only 21% who said that they would never support Civic Platform.
21
 Even the 
government’s supporters often defended the Tusk administration on the grounds that its main 
                                                          
17
 See, for example: J. Cieński, ‘Rząd realistycznych małych kroków’, Rzeczpospolita, 22 December 2008; J. 
Makowski, ‘Polska modernizowana piórem’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 December 2010; and D. Tusk, ‘Premier Tusk: 
‘Czego dokonaliśmy, co nam się nie udało’, 12 March 2011, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 15 March 2011). 
18
 For a range of critical and sympathetic analyses, see: B. Wildstein, ‘Bezideowość polityki polskiej’, 
Rzeczpospolita, 27-28 February 2010; P. Skwieciński, ‘Platforma w poszukiwaniu utraconego sensu’, 
Rzeczpospolita, 8 March 2011; R. Grochal, ‘Platforma środka’, 14 June 2011, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 16 
June 2011); M. Janicki and W. Władyka, ‘Tuskism’, Polityka, 21-28 June 2011; J. Makowski, ‘Można wybrać 
tylko wino i przystawkę’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 September 2011; P. Zaremba, ‘Platforma à la Kołakowski’, 
Rzeczpospolita, 17-18 September 2011; and J. A. Majcherek, ‘Liberał po przejściach’, Polityka, 21-27 
September 2011. 
19
 See, for example: R. A. Ziemkiewicz, ‘Pułapka Kaczyńskiego’, Rzeczpospolita, 15 March 2010; B. Wildstein, 
‘Nie będzie końca politycznej wojny’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 July 2010; Ł. Warzecha, ‘Kaczyński w teatrze Tuska’, 
Rzeczpospolita, 22 October 2010; and I. Janke, ‘Efektowna kurtka premiera’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 July 2011. 
20
 See: W. Szcacki, ‘Sondaż “Gazety”: Wciąż wielka nieufność do PiS’, 12 February 2009, www.wyborcza.pl 
(Accessed 17 February 2009). 
21
 See: CBOS, Wybory parlamentarne 2011 - zainteresowanie, pewność głosowania, alternatywy wyborcze, 
elektoraty negatywne, July 2011 (June-July 2011 data), CBOS: Warsaw, p10. 
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achievement was to restore social harmony and, for all his alleged indecisiveness, Polish 
voters seemed to prefer Mr Tusk’s apparently more consensual style of politics.22  
 
This was encapsulated in the notion of rejecting the so-called 'Fourth Republic', a programme 
based on a radical critique of post-1989 Poland as corrupt and requiring far-reaching moral 
and political reform. Originally an idea that enjoyed quite broad political support (including 
figures linked to Civic Platform), the 'Fourth Republic' came to be used increasingly by Mr 
Tusk’s party as a pejorative term to characterise the programme and practices of the Law and 
Justice-led governments and tool for mobilising the majority of Polish voters who rejected 
Mr Kaczyński's party as too confrontational.23 This strategy proved a great success in the 
2007 election, which Mr Tusk's party turned it into a referendum on the 'Fourth Republic'.
24
 
The basis of Civic Platform's continuing high levels of popular support and key to its 
continued electoral success was, therefore, its ability to frame political debate in terms of a 
choice between support for and opposition to the 'Fourth Republic', and to position itself as, 
whatever its other shortcomings, the party best placed to prevent Law and Justice returning to 
power. 
 
Law and Justice found it increasingly (and frustratingly) difficult to break this logic.
25
 The 
party did make various attempts to present a more conciliatory image and focus on ‘bread and 
butter’ economic issues and modernising Poland, pushing its traditional themes (such as 
fighting crime and corruption, and making a more fundamental break with the communist 
past) into the background.
26
 But most of the time these efforts had little impact on the party’s 
fortunes. The only period when Law and Justice appeared to be narrowing Civic Platform’s 
opinion poll lead was in the run up to the June-July 2010 presidential election that followed 
the Smolensk tragedy. Running an extremely effective and sure-footed campaign directed by 
politicians from the party’s moderate wing, Mr Kaczyński used the snap election as an 
opportunity to re-invent his party by softening its rhetoric and reaching out to centrist 
                                                          
22
 See, for example: J. Kucharczyk, ‘PiS nie doścignie Platformy’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 January 2010. 
23
 See: P. Śpiewak, ‘Pięć lat po czwartej’, Polityka, 26 June 2010; and R. Bugaj, ‘Osierocona idea IV RP’, 
Rzeczpospolita, 6 July 2010. 
24
 See: ‘The Birth of a Bipolar Party System or Referendum on a Polarising Government?’ 
25
 See, for example: M. Karnowski, ‘PiS jak ze snów Platformy,’ 28 July 2008, www.dziennik.pl (Accessed 30 
July 2008). 
26
 See, for example: K. Manys, ‘PiS chce radykalnie zmienić oblicze’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 January 2009; M. 
Janicki, ‘Prezes jak nowy’, Polityka, 7 February 2009; and W. Wybranowski, ‘PiS porzuca “układu”, 
Rzeczpospolita, 17 February 2010. 
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voters.
27
 In the event, by winning 36.5% in the first round (compared to 41.5% for Mr 
Komorowski) Mr Kaczyński managed to force a second round run-off, which he lost but with 
a respectable 47% of the votes. 
 
However, almost as soon as the election results were announced Mr Kaczyński quickly 
abandoned the more moderate and consensual tone that he adopted during the presidential 
campaign and returned to his earlier confrontational style.
28
 Dis-associating himself from the 
moderates who had run his presidential campaign, the Law and Justice leader launched a 
series of bitter attacks on the ruling party and refused to co-operate with the newly elected 
President, describing his election as a ‘misunderstanding’ and symbolically boycotting his 
inauguration. Mr Kaczyński started to make the Smolensk air crash and subsequent 
investigation into its causes a central issue for the party, saying that the government bore 
‘moral and political responsibility’ for the errors that led to the tragedy through its relentless 
attacks on his brother and lack of care for his security. He also accused the prime minister of 
weakness and naively playing into Russia’s hands by allowing Moscow to oversee the main 
crash investigation.
29
 
 
Mr Kaczyński’s inflammatory rhetoric and focus on the Smolensk tragedy squandered the 
political capital that the party had accumulated during the presidential election. His 
uncompromising stance may have buttressed support for Law and Justice among its core 
supporters. However, as the party’s disappointing showing in the autumn 2010 local elections 
showed (when it failed to win control of any of Poland’s 16 regional authorities), over-doing 
the aggressive language and using Smolensk as a political weapon prevented Law and Justice 
from offering a coherent alternative to Civic Platform and eroded support for the party among 
more moderate voters. Indeed, Mr Kaczyński’s post-election volte face forced a group of key 
Law and Justice moderates led by his presidential campaign manager Joanna Kluzik-
Rostkowska to break away from the party and, in November 2010, form a new centre-right 
                                                          
27
 See, for example: Ł. Warzecha, ‘Komorowski w pułapce Kaczyńskiego’, Rzeczpospolita, 17 June 2010; and I. 
Krzemiński, ‘Polityka resentymentu’, Rzeczpospolita, 2 August 2010. 
28
 See, for example: P. Śpiewak, ‘Powrót talibanu’, Polityka, 24 July 2010; P. Gursztyn, ‘Więcej chaosu niż 
perfidii’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 July 2010; A. Nowakowska and D. Wielowiejska, ‘PiS oblężoną twierdzą’, 10 
September 2010, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 13 September 2010); M. Janicki, ‘Świat według prezesa’, 
Polityka, 18 September 2010; and A. Stankiewicz and P. Śmiłowicz, ‘Samotność mściciela’, Newsweek, 19 
September 2010. 
29
 See, for example: I. Janke, ‘Ostatnia wojna prezesa Kaczyńskiego’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 September 2010; and 
J. Stróżyk and W. Wybranowski, ‘Kaczyński: Polska się budzi’, Rzeczpospolita, 11 April 2011. 
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grouping called ‘Poland is the Most Important’ (Polska Jest Najważniejsza: PJN), which had 
been Mr Kaczyński’s presidential campaign slogan.30 
 
The Campaign 
 
At the start of the campaign, the only questions thus appeared to be about the extent of Civic 
Platform’s victory, whether or not its junior coalition partner would be able to cross the 5% 
threshold, and if Mr Tusk’s party would need to find new or additional coalition partners to 
govern? Civic Platform’s position was strengthened further when Mr Kaczyński’s party’s 
campaign got off to a false start following comments made at a June Brussels seminar, 
organised by Law and Justice MEPs, by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, director of the controversial 
Radio Maryja broadcaster, who accused the Tusk government of using ‘totalitarian’ methods 
against his media organisation. The clergyman was an important Law and Justice supporter 
and his media conglomerate extremely influential among Catholic-nationalist voters who 
comprised a key element of the party’s core electorate among older, church-going voters.31 
However, Father Rydzyk also alienated many of the centrist voters whom Law and Justice 
was trying to attract and his remarks were widely condemned, even by some commentators 
who were generally sympathetic to Mr Kaczyński’s party.32 Civic Platform, on the other 
hand, began the election by holding a successful national convention at which party 
members, led by Mr Tusk, debated the party’s activities since its formation in 2001 and drew 
up a balance sheet of its four years in government. The ruling party’s campaign was based on 
setting out a general vision for the evolutionary reform and modernisation of Poland aimed at 
making the country a strong player within Europe. Mr Tusk’s party tried to take credit for 
Poland’s relatively strong economic performance, arguing that it was in large part due to 
various government measures that the country remained a ‘green island of growth’ within 
Europe. At a time of increasing economic uncertainty, they argued, Poles should choose a 
safe and competent team that had at least started the process of modernisation and investment 
                                                          
30
 See: P. Gursztyn and W. Wybranowski, ‘Z PiS do stowarzyszenia’, Rzeczpospolita, 17 November 2010; and 
R. Grochal and W. Szacki, ‘Ruch Kluzik-Rostkowskiej’, 17 November 2010, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 17 
November 2010). 
31
 For example, a November 2011 CBOS survey found that 70% of regular Radio Maryja listeners voted for 
Law and Justice compared to only 14% who supported Civic Platform. See: CBOS, Dwadzieścia lat Radia 
Maryja, CBOS: Warsaw, December 2011 (September-November 2011 data), p9. 
32
 See, for example: P. Zaremba, ‘To gorzej niż zbrodnia, to błąd’, Rzeczpospolita, 27 June 2011. 
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in the country’s future prosperity and development; exemplified by the party’s cautious initial 
campaign slogan ‘Poland Under Construction’.33 
 
Civic Platform also used its tenth-anniversary convention to highlight that it was winning 
over new converts from rival parties, as well-known figures from across the political 
spectrum declared their intention to run on the party’s candidate lists.34 Thus, one of the 
convention highlights was a speech by Mrs Kluzik-Rostkowska, perhaps the most 
controversial of the ‘switchers’, where she declared that she would be leaving ‘Poland is the 
Most Important’ to support Civic Platform.35 At the other end of the political spectrum, the 
convention also the saw the accession to the party of well-known centre-left politicians, 
following the earlier defection to Civic Platform of Bartosz Arłukowicz, one of the most high 
profile and popular left-wing figures linked to the Democratic Left Alliance. Mr Arłukowicz - 
who, ironically, first gained national prominence due to his high profile role in a special 
parliamentary commission set up to investigate the ‘gambling affair’ - joined the government 
as the prime minister’s plenipotentiary for contact with the ‘socially excluded’; a ministerial 
position created especially for him. These defections were part of a concerted long-term 
strategy designed to broaden Civic Platform’s appeal and weaken its political opponents by 
co-opting some of their best known politicians and authority figures.
36
 In his keynote 
convention address, Mr Tusk stressed that he saw the presence of such a wide range of views 
and opposing opinions within Civic Platform as one of the party’s strengths.37 
 
Much of the summer campaigning was dominated by the so-called ‘debate about debates’ 
which started when Mr Tusk challenged Mr Kaczyński and senior Law and Justice politicians 
to take part in a series of televised confrontations with Civic Platform’s incumbent 
ministers.
38
 Mr Tusk wanted to highlight Law and Justice’s lack of experienced, high quality 
specialists who could handle the top jobs of running the country, given that Mr Kaczyński’s 
                                                          
33
 See: K. Manys, ‘Platforma rusza z kampanią’, Rzeczpospolita, 6-7 August 2011; and M. Szułdrzyński, ‘Tusk 
na budowie’, Rzeczposolita, 18 August 2011. For more on Civic Platform’s election programme and appeal, see: 
M. Janicki, ‘Czy Tusk zasługuje na więcej’, Polityka, 14-20 September 2011; A. Nowakowska and D. 
Wielowiejska, ‘Program wyborczy PO. Mały realizm zderza się z kryzysem’, 22 September 2011, 
www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 23 September 2011); and R. Grochal, ‘Państwo PO’, 1 October 2011, 
www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 5 October 2011). 
34
 See: E. Olczyk and A. Górski, ‘Donald Tusk do PO: idźcie i zwyciężajcie’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 June 2011. 
35
 See: P. Gursztyn, ‘Kluzik-Rostkowska wzmocni Platformę’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 June 2011. 
36
 See: P. Gursztyn, ‘Partia Tuska skręca w lewo’, Rzeczpospolita, 19 May 2011. 
37
 See: PO, ‘Donald Tusk: Służymy Polsce i Polakom’, 11 June 2011, www.platforma.org (Accessed 21 June 
2011) 
38
 See: P. Wroński, ‘Tusk: zapraszam na debatę’, 22 August 2011, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 28 August 
2011). 
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party lost many of its most talented and experienced members in the Smolensk crash.
39
 The 
Civic Platform leader also tried to capitalise on the fact that he was a much more 
accomplished TV debater than Mr Kaczyński. Mr Tusk out-performed the Law and Justice 
leader in their last debate before the 2007 election, which was widely considered to be a 
turning point in that campaign, and this made Mr Kaczyński extremely wary of participating 
in such forums alongside the Civic Platform leader.
40
 Mr Kaczyński therefore insisted on a 
series of terms and conditions that he knew the Civic Platform leader would never accept 
(stipulating that the debates be held in the Law and Justice party headquarters) or were un-
measurable (announcing that he would only debate when the prime minister agreed to ‘lower 
the white flag’, implying that he had been insufficiently robust in both confronting vested 
interests at home and defending Poland abroad). 
 
Initially, it seemed that Law and Justice’s refusal to debate with Civic Platform would lose 
the party support by making it appear weak and unprofessional.
41
 However, this was not the 
case and, as the campaign progressed, it became an increasingly tight race.
42
 Mr Kaczyński’s 
strategy of embarking on a nationwide speaking tour instead of participating in televised 
debates appeared to work, while Civic Platform, having originally expected to cruise to 
victory, found itself increasingly on the defensive and struggling to develop a clear campaign 
message. Moreover, although Mr Kaczyński’s campaign speeches could be quite sharp in 
tone, once again Law and Justice tried to moderate its more abrasive rhetoric. Knowing it had 
little scope to win over many voters beyond its core, the party concentrated instead on 
running a ‘softer and gentler’ campaign aimed at de-mobilising those Civic Platform voters 
who were motivated primarily by fear of Mr Kaczyński. 43  Mr Kaczyński also avoided 
focusing too much on the Smolensk tragedy which party strategists knew was not a major 
concern to voters beyond its core electorate and gave the impression that the party was 
backward looking and obsessed with a single issue.
44
 At the same time, they knew that the 
party could rely upon the ‘below the radar’ support of the many civil society initiatives that 
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 See: P. Śmiłowicz, ‘Czy to koniec PiS?’ Newsweek, 18 April 2010. 
40
 See: R. Grochal, ‘Dlaczego PiS unika debat’, 25 August 2011, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 28 August 2011). 
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arose among those who were still fired up by the relentless search for the culprits behind the 
Smolensk tragedy.
45
 Although it was not part of the official campaign, the Smolensk issue 
thus consolidated and mobilised the party’s most committed supporters, which it knew could 
be very significant in the event of a low turnout. 
 
In its official campaign, however, Law and Justice attempted to construct a broader appeal by 
concentrating on issues such as unemployment, health care, opportunities for young people, 
and the poor state of Poland’s infrastructure. Mr Kaczyński’s party seized on the fact that 
many Poles felt that, even taking the economic crisis into account, Mr Tusk’s government 
had not delivered the increase in opportunities that it had promised in 2007, a message 
exemplified by its main campaign slogan ‘Poland Deserves More’. 46  Indeed, one of the 
leitmotifs of the Law and Justice campaign became a question posed by pepper farmer 
Stanisław Kowalczyk who spoiled what was meant to be a routine campaign visit for Mr 
Tusk. In front of live TV cameras, Mr Kowalczyk complained about how he and other 
farmers had not received any help from the government after heavy gales had devastated 
farms in his region and asked in an emotional voice: ‘How do I live now Mr prime minister, 
how do I live?’ The line was quickly picked up by Mr Kaczyński’s party and Mr Kowalczyk 
was invited to speak at a Law and Justice election convention.
47
 Interestingly, Law and 
Justice also made a particularly strong pitch to younger voters, who were crucial in getting 
Civic Platform elected in 2007. Law and Justice correctly identified a ‘glass ceiling’ that 
many young Poles, especially those from smaller towns and rural areas, felt that they 
encountered and the fact that, in spite of economic growth, Poland still had high levels of 
youth unemployment and even many of those who managed to get a job struggled to obtain 
(much less pay) mortgages and support their families. This included a high profile campaign 
poster featuring a number of its younger female candidates with the strap-line: ‘Come with 
us!’ which contrasted strongly with the (generally middle aged and greying) men who 
featured in many of the Civic Platform campaign adverts.
48
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For its part, Civic Platform knew that it could not concentrate solely on its relatively modest 
achievements in office. Although it came up with a rather defensive slogan for the final stage 
of the campaign (‘We will do more’),49 the party also developed a strong counter-offensive. 
Firstly, it drew upon Mr Tusk, perhaps the party’s single greatest electoral asset and certainly 
its most effective campaigner, who undertook a nationwide tour on the so-called ‘Tuskobus’. 
The road show of semi-planned encounters, speeches, interviews and press conferences 
ensured continual media coverage as the Civic Platform leader visited poorer towns and was 
seen to listen to ordinary voters’ concerns and complaints. Mr Tusk also showed that we was 
not afraid to face down angry anti-government football supporters who regularly attacked 
him for what they claimed was his administration’s excessively authoritarian crackdown on 
hooliganism.
50
 
 
Secondly, in the final stages of the campaign Civic Platform significantly ratcheted up its 
anti-Law and Justice rhetoric. For example, it released an extremely powerful campaign 
advert showing scuffles between a group who protested against the removal of a cross that 
was erected in front of the presidential palace after the Smolensk tragedy and the authorities, 
together with violent scenes involving football hooligans. The so-called ‘defenders of the 
cross’ were associated with the Mr Kaczyński’s party and some Law and Justice leaders had 
also expressed sympathy for known football hooligans defending them as ‘patriots’. The 
advert ended with the phrase, ‘They are going to vote, what about you?’ implying that a Law 
and Justice victory would hand Poland over to the kind of people depicted in the film.
51
 Civic 
Platform’s efforts to mobilise its more passive supporters were also helped by a controversial 
book-length interview with Mr Kaczyński published towards the end of the campaign. Here 
the Law and Justice leader said that German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ascent to power did 
not happen ‘by chance alone’ and suggested that she was trying to re-build German imperial 
power. Law and Justice was thus forced to spend much of the last week of the campaign 
trying to explain what exactly Mr Kaczyński meant to say and responding to claims that the 
party was playing on anti-German sentiments.
52
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Results 
 
As Table 1 shows, the election saw a clear victory for Civic Platform, which thus became the 
first incumbent governing party to secure re-election for a second term of office since the fall 
of communism in 1989. Although most commentators expected the party to win, it did so by 
a larger than expected margin garnering 39.18% of the vote while Law and Justice came a 
strong but fairly distant second with 29.89%. As a result, Mr Tusk’s party won 207 seats in 
the 460-member Sejm, compared with 157 for Law and Justice.  
 
 
Table 1: October 2011 Polish parliamentary election results to the Sejm 
 
 2007 2011 % 
Change  % Seats % Seats 
Civic Platform (PO) 41.51 209 39.18 207 -2.33 
Law and Justice (PiS) 32.11 166 29.89 157 -2.22 
Palikot Movement (RP)   10.02 40 +10.02 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 8.91 31 8.36 28 -0.55 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)* 13.15 53 8.24 27 -4.91 
Polish is the Most Important (PJN)   2.19  +2.19 
New Right (NP)   1.06  +1.06 
Polish Labour Party (PPP)   1.00  0.55  -0.45 
Source: Polish State Electoral Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/) 
* In 2007, the party contested the election as part of the ‘Left and Democrats’ (LiD) coalition with Polish Social 
Democracy (SdPl) and the Democrats (Demokraci). 
 
 
Civic Platform’s victory was due, in part, to its ability to craft an extremely broad appeal and 
identify itself skilfully with mainstream public opinion. However, given that the size of the 
two main parties ‘core’ electorates was roughly similar,53 one of the main factors determining 
the election outcome was always likely to be the level of turnout. Many observers felt that a 
lower turnout would benefit Law and Justice whose core supporters were more highly 
motivated and easier to mobilise than Civic Platform’s less disciplined voters. For example, a 
June-July 2011 CBOS survey found that 69% of Law and Justice voters said that they were 
certain to vote for that party (increasing to 76% when including those who were almost 
certain) compared to only 56% of Civic Platform voters.
54
 The same survey found that 42% 
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of Law and Justice voters would not consider voting for any other party compared to only 
31% of Civic Platform voters who said the same.
55
 The latter had turned out in large numbers 
in 2007 mainly because they disliked Mr Kaczyński’s confrontational style of politics, so the 
key to the party’s victory would be its ability to generate fear about the possible 
consequences of Law and Justice returning to power.
56
 
 
Table 2: Turnout in post-1989 Polish elections (%) 
 
 Presidential Parliamentary 
1990 60.63(1) 
53.40(2) 
 
1991  43.20 
1993  52.13 
1995 64.70(1) 
68.23(2) 
 
1997  47.93 
2000 61.12  
2001  46.29 
2005 49.74(1) 
50.99(2) 
40.57 
2007  53.88 
2010 54.94(1) 
55.31(2) 
 
2011  48.92 
 
Source: ‘15 chętnych na jeden mandate,’ Rzeczpospolita, 8-9 October 2011; and Polish State Electoral 
Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/) 
 
The election result suggested that, although many of the party’s supporters were disappointed 
with its slow progress in modernising the country, most voters still viewed Civic Platform as 
the better guarantor of stability at a time of crisis.
57
 For example, a May 2011 CBOS survey 
found that the most important reason given by Civic Platform voters for supporting the party 
(by 19% of respondents) was that there was a lack of alternatives and it represented the 
‘lesser evil’.58 Moreover, Mr Kaczyński’s mistakes during the final stages of the campaign, 
such as his comments about Mrs Merkel, provided Mr Tusk’s party with the ammunition that 
it needed for an effective counter-mobilisation of its more passive supporters. In the event, as 
Table 2 shows, at 48.92% the level of turnout in 2011 was around the norm for much of the 
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1990s and early 2000s (although down from 53.88% in 2007) which meant that enough Civic 
Platform supporters came out to vote to give Mr Tusk’s party its historic second victory by a 
very clear margin. 
 
As Table 1 also shows, the Peasant Party won 8.36% of the vote, finishing fourth among the 
five parties that crossed the 5% threshold, and 28 seats in the new Sejm. This gave the 
governing coalition 235 seats in total, enough to secure a small but workable parliamentary 
majority. Although some party leaders had hoped for more,
59
 this was a relatively good result 
for the agrarian party given that many opinion polls during the campaign (and, indeed, 
previous parliament) showed its support hovering around the 5% mark, and it was the first 
time that the party had managed to broadly hold on to its share of the vote after a period in 
office. In fact, as Table 3 shows, the Peasant Party had the most developed grassroots 
organisation of any Polish party with an estimated 70-128,000 members. It also had the 
highest level of local territorial penetration with, for example, 4,175 councillors in the 
smallest rural parishes (those with fewer than 20,000 voters) compared with 1,655 for Law 
and Justice, 981 for Civic Platform and 596 for the Democratic Left Alliance.
60
 
Consequently, much of the party’s campaigning took place at the local level and was often 
not picked up by the national media;
 61
 as a result of which opinion polls often tended to 
under-state the party’s actual level of support. 
 
 
Table 3: Membership of the five main Polish parties, 2010-11 
 
Party Number of members 
Polish Peasant Party 70,000-128,000 
Democratic Left Alliance 58,500 
Civic Platform 45,000-50,000 
Palikot Movement 40,000 
Law and Justice 18,000-22,000 
 
Source: L. Antkiewicz, ‘Polacy nie garną się do partii. Zyskuje tylko PO’, 8 February 2010, www.gazeta.pl 
(Accessed 9 February 2010); R. Grochal, ‘Platforma pęcznieje’, 24 February 2020, www.wyborcza.pl 
(Accessed 25 February 2010); and A. Kublik, ‘SLD się liczy’, 5 November 2011, www.wyborcza.pl (Accessed 
10 November 2011).  
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Apart from the re-election of Mr Tusk’s government, the other major story of this election 
was the success of the Palikot Movement, an anti-clerical liberal party formed less than a year 
before by the controversial and flamboyant businessman and former Civic Platform deputy 
Janusz Palikot. As Table 1 shows, the Palikot Movement ended up winning just over 10% of 
the vote, which translated into 40 seats making it the third largest grouping in the new Sejm, 
overtaking the longer-established Peasant Party and the once-powerful Democratic Left 
Alliance. With his radical and outspoken attacks on the Law and Justice party, Mr Palikot had 
previously been a useful outrider for Civic Platform. However, after the Smolensk tragedy he 
started to become a liability when he blamed the crash on the irresponsibility of the 
Kaczyński brothers and claimed that the late President may have been under the influence of 
alcohol during the ill-fated flight (earlier he had accused Mr Kaczyński of being an 
alcoholic). At the end of 2010, Mr Palikot left Civic Platform complaining at what he saw as 
its conservative tilt and formed his own political grouping with a socially liberal programme 
that included reducing the influence of Poland’s influential Catholic Church in public life, the 
de-criminalisation of so-called ‘soft’ drugs, abortion on demand, and more rights for sexual 
and other minorities including the legalisation of same-sex civil unions. 
 
Until the final stages of the election, support for the Palikot Movement stood at a mere 1-3%. 
However, Mr Palikot ran a dynamic and extremely well executed campaign trying to move 
beyond his frivolous image and present himself as a serious political leader and intellectual. 
For example, a November 2011 CBOS report showed how the number of voters who said that 
they trusted Mr Palikot increased from 24% in August 2011 to 36% in October, while the 
number who distrusted him fell from 46% to 36% over the same period (although by 
November the numbers had returned to their pre-election levels).
62
 Knowing that the impact 
of his original anti-clerical appeal was likely to be limited, Mr Palikot began to place greater 
emphasis upon a broader message of business-friendly, small-state social liberalism, 
promising to bring about a ‘modern, secular, socially oriented, civic and friendly’ state. The 
Palikot Movement thereby attracted a significant number of younger voters who wanted 
efficient government but also had socially liberal views on lifestyle issues and felt that Civic 
Platform and the Democratic Left Alliance were too establishment-oriented and deferential 
towards the Catholic Church.
63
 For example, the 2011 Polish Election Survey found support 
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for the Palikot Movement stood at: 21% among 18-24 year-olds, 24% among young first-time 
voters and 27% among students. It also found that 20% of those who never attended church 
services had voted for Mr Palikot as had 17% of those who only went a few times a year, 
compared to 0% among those went several times a week and 5% who attended weekly.
64
 
18% of voters who supported Civic Platform in 2007 and turned out to vote again in 2011 
(34% of them abstained this time) switched their votes to the Palikot Movement.
65
 In total, 
43% of all Palikot Movement voters had previously voted for Civic Platform.
66
 
 
The success of Mr Palikot’s ‘new left’ was also achieved at the expense of the Democratic 
Left Alliance, previously the dominant party on the Polish centre-left which suffered its worst 
ever election defeat finishing, as Table 1 shows, a distant fifth with only 8.24% of the vote 
and 27 seats. The result was a huge disappointment for the party and prompted Mr 
Napieralski to stand down as leader. Only a year earlier, he ran a surprisingly vigorous 
presidential election campaign to finish an impressive third with a much better than expected 
13.7% of the vote.
67
 This appeared to establish the Democratic Left Alliance as the dominant 
force on the Polish left and Mr Napieralski as the party’s un-questioned leader. However, it 
proved to be a false dawn and the party lost ground as it struggled to find an effective 
response to the series of high profile defections to Civic Platform by prominent left-wing 
politicians such as Mr Arłukowicz.68 
 
Mr Napieralski became too self-confident after his surprisingly good presidential election 
result and, as a consequence, when drawing up the party’s election candidate lists paid more 
attention to internal party manoeuvring than choosing candidates who could attract broad 
support.
69
 For example, he reneged on earlier promises to give prominent positions to well-
known figures such as gay rights activist Robert Biedroń and pro-abortion campaigner 
Wanda Nowicka, thereby prompting their defection to the Palikot Movement and damaging 
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the party’s standing among potential supporters on the liberal left.70 At the same time, the 
Democratic Left Alliance campaign lacked the Palikot Movement’s energy and vigour and 
failed to develop a distinctive and coherent message.
71
 For example, while Mr Napieralski 
originally argued that the party needed to position itself as a clearer left-wing alternative to 
the Civic Platform-led government during the campaign he signed a co-operation agreement 
with the Business Centre Club employers’ organisation. Similarly, having begun his 
leadership by positioning himself as the ‘Polish Zapataro’, a reference to the Spanish 
Socialist prime minister who had introduced a radical transformative programme of social 
liberalism and anti-clericalism, during the election campaign, like many previous Democratic 
Left Alliance leaders, Mr Napieralski ultimately proved extremely cautious about giving too 
high a profile to religious issues and embracing cultural liberalism too wholeheartedly. 
Consequently, the party was completely un-prepared for the emergence of a major challenger 
on its liberal left flank, in the shape of the Palikot Movement that took a much clearer-cut 
position on, and appeared to show much greater determination in tackling. moral-cultural 
issues.
72
 
 
The long-term trajectory of Polish politics 
 
In terms of the long-term trajectory of Polish politics, this election once again confirmed that 
the so-called ‘post-communist divide’ between the ex-communist and post-Solidarity 
electoral blocs that had dominated and appeared to provide a structural order to the Polish 
party system during the 1990s
73
 had definitely passed into history. However, as far as future 
scenarios were concerned, two main sets of question emerged. Firstly, did the election 
confirm the emergence of a stable Polish party system consolidated around a bi-polar division 
between Civic Platform and Law and Justice? Secondly, turning to possible sources of re-
alignment within the Polish party system, what were the future prospects for the Polish left 
and, specifically, what did the emergence of the Palikot movement mean for its future 
development? 
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It is easy to forget that the Civic Platform-Law and Justice duopoly emerged conjecturally - 
indeed, almost accidentally - in 2005 and that originally the socio-demographic profiles of the 
two party electorates (and, arguably, many of their policies) were actually very similar.
74
 
Indeed, at the time they were seen as natural coalition partners. However, the fact that this 
divide not only endured but strengthened and went on to dominate and structure the Polish 
political scene for the next six years suggested that it was more authentic than might have 
originally appeared.
75
 Indeed, as the divisions between the two party elites widened and 
deepened so did those between their electorates, exemplified by the decline in Civic Platform 
and Law and Justice voters who put the other party as their second voting preference from 
45% and 37% respectively in July 2005 to only 3% and 6% in June-July 2011.
76
 The same 
June-July 2011 CBOS survey found that 75% of Civic Platform voters said that they would 
definitely not vote for Mr Kaczyński’s party and 68% of Law and Justice voters said the same 
about Mr Tusk’s (even more than the 48% who said that they would not vote for the 
Democratic Left Alliance).
77
 Moreover, while it may not have done so originally, there was 
also some evidence that the Civic Platform-Law and Justice divide increasingly reflected and 
mapped onto deeper ideological and socio-cultural divisions
78
 and that the two electorates’ 
social bases were becoming somewhat more clearly defined: with Law and Justice voters 
older, more rural and religious, and less well educated and Civic Platform supporters 
younger, more urban, better off, better educated, and more secular.
79
 In fact, in many ways, 
the deep political polarisation and bitterness that characterised the two parties’ on-going 
rivalry meant that they became the main points of reference for each other, with the existence 
of (and repellence from) the other being the key to their political appeal; and possibly even 
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very existence.
80
 Thus, it was in the political interests of both parties to keep their respective 
electorates deeply mistrustful of each other, leaving them in a kind of mutual political ‘death 
grip’ where if one of the two rivals were to disappear from the political scene this would 
create a (potentially existential) crisis for the other. 
 
Moreover, all the various attempts during this period to develop an alternative to the Civic 
Platform-Law and Justice duopoly on the right and centre-right ended in failure. In this 
election, this included the attempt by ‘Poland is the Most Important’ to position itself at the 
interstice of the two large electoral blocs: more socially and culturally conservative than 
Civic Platform but more moderate than Law and Justice and more economically liberal than 
both of them. At one point, this appeared to be a promising location on the political spectrum 
for a new formation to emerge, given the large number of Law and Justice liberals and 
moderates who became alienated from their party over the years and Civic Platform 
conservatives potentially disillusioned at the party’s recent ‘shift to the left’. Indeed, early 
polls in the 2011 election campaign suggested that ‘Poland is Most Important’ had a better 
chance of making a breakthrough than the Palikot Movement. However, apart from the heavy 
blow of Mrs Kluzik-Rostkowska’s defection to Civic Platform, the new party could not find a 
way of engaging with voters and carving out a political niche for itself.
81
 The fate of ‘Poland 
is the Most Important’ thus highlighted the apparent resilience of the Civic Platform-Law and 
Justice divide. 
 
At the same time, as Table 4 shows, Civic Platform and Law and Justice once again easily 
confirmed their positions as the largest parties securing a combined share of the vote and 
seats of 69.07% and 79.13% respectively; albeit down from 73.62% and 85.92% in 2007. 
Moreover, the election also saw a substantial fall in the level of aggregate electoral volatility 
calculated according to the so-called ‘Pederson index’ from 24.6% in 2007 (and a massive 
49.3% in 2001) to only 13.5%;
82
 although it remained high by European standards.
83
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Table 4: Party fragmentation in post-1989 Poland 
 
 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 
Number of parties elected 
to the Sejm 
29 6 5 6 6 4 5 
Share of votes won by two 
largest parties (%) 
24.31 35.81 60.96 53.72 51.13 73.62 69.07 
Share of seats won by two 
largest parties (%) 
25.52 65.87 79.35 61.09 62.6 81.52 79.13 
 
Source: R. Markowski and M. Cześnik, ‘Polski system partyjny: dekada zmian instytucjonalnych i ich 
konsekwencje,’ in R. Markowski (ed.), System Partyjny i Zachowanie Wyborcze: Dekada Polskich 
Doświadczeń, Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002, pp.17-47(20); and author’s calculations. 
 
Another factor that appeared to encourage party system consolidation and stabilisation was 
the Polish state party funding regime established in 2001. Since then, the state became the 
largest source of income for the main Polish parties at a time when political campaigning was 
increasingly professionalised, and therefore costly. Although it was scaled back somewhat at 
the beginning of 2011, this development clearly favoured the larger ‘insider’ parties like 
Civic Platform and Law and Justice and made it increasingly difficult for new entrants to 
challenge this duopoly.
84
 
 
However, other evidence suggested that the Polish political scene was more fluid and 
potentially unstable than appeared on the surface
85
 and that, in the longer-term, there was a 
possibility of further party re-alignment. Firstly, as Table 2 shows and this election once 
again confirmed, electoral turnout in Polish parliamentary elections remained extremely low, 
suggesting that, notwithstanding the apparent fall in the level of electoral volatility, the Polish 
electorate remained relatively ‘open’ and available to potential challenger parties.  
 
Secondly, although the Civic Platform-Law and Justice divide appeared to reflect deeper 
ideological and cultural divisions within Polish society, levels of party institutionalisation 
remained low and the nature of the links between parties and their supporters extremely 
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weak. For example, according to a survey of 27 countries from the mid-to-late 2000s Poland 
had one of the lowest levels of party membership in Europe, at only 0.99% as a percentage of 
the electorate (304,465 members) compared with the average of 4.65%; and this figure had 
actually fallen from 1.15% at the end of the 1990s.
86
 This stemmed partly from the fact that 
Polish parties had made few attempts to develop organic links with and ‘encapsulate’ their 
supporters. But it was also because Poles had extremely negative attitudes towards parties so 
that even if party strategists actively sought to recruit substantially more members their 
prospects for success would have been slim. For example, a September-October 2011 CBOS 
survey found that most respondents felt that political parties: caused arguments and confusion 
(90%), comprised cliques of power-seeking politicians (86%), were driven primarily by 
personal ambition (77%), did more harm than good (83%) and did not really know what they 
wanted (69%).
87
 Similarly, a September 2011 TNS OBOP survey found that the main reason 
cited by non-voters (37% of respondents) for not participating in Polish elections was that 
they did not trust Polish parties and politicians.
88
 Survey evidence also suggested that levels 
of party identification had actually fallen in recent years. For example, a June 2008 CBOS 
survey found that the number of respondents who felt that there were no parties with whom 
they identified at all had increased from 27% in 1998 to 50% in 2008. Only 36% clearly 
identified with a political party in 2008 compared with 57% in 1998.
89
 This, together with 
continuing low electoral turnout, suggested that neither of the two big electoral blocs had 
really succeeded in rooting themselves solidly in the Polish electorate.  
 
Thirdly, while the Polish state party funding regime certainly discriminated in favour of the 
existing parties, this did not mean that there was no scope at all for new entrants. Indeed, the 
breakthrough of the Palikot Movement showed how a challenger party could emerge 
regardless of the state party funding barrier. The new party only spent only 1.7 million złoties 
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on its 2011 campaign compared to 30 million by Law and Justice, 29 million by Civic 
Platform, 24 million by the Democratic Left Alliance and 13 million by the Peasant Party.
90
 
 
Fourthly, and more profoundly, arguably the ‘ideological glue’ holding Civic Platform and 
Law and Justice together was much weaker than might have appeared on the surface. These 
parties’ long-term future cohesion depended upon their ability to frame the kind of broad, 
integrative ideological narratives which play a crucial role in holding broad parties together, 
and provide a sustainable basis for the development of, durable, diverse and heterogeneous 
political formations. They frame political action, give such parties purposiveness and identity 
as political organisations, and socialise incoming leadership elites thereby helping diverse 
political formations in post-communist states to hold together, particularly when they 
encounter periods of political crisis.
91
 Although both Civic Platform and Law and Justice had 
at various points in their short histories attempted to develop more complex ideological 
narratives centring on the nature of post-communist transformation it was questionable 
whether they had succeeded in doing so. 
 
Arguably, and surprisingly given that the party just achieved a historic second consecutive 
election victory, it was Civic Platform that always had the relatively weaker ideological 
underpinnings. Initially, the party had attempted to profile itself as a modernising form of 
pro-market, right-wing liberalism focusing on economic issues (its early flagship policy was 
introducing a 15% ‘flat tax’) and subsequently incorporated a national-patriotic appeal and 
moderate form of social conservatism (even elements of Euroscepticism). However, 
particularly since the 2007 election, Civic Platform appeared self-consciously to have 
functioned more as a ‘catch-all’ party downplaying both its economic liberalism and social 
conservatism. Instead, it presented itself as a somewhat amorphous modernising and pro-
European moderate grouping in opposition to the forces of provincial conservative 
nationalism, exemplified (allegedly) by Law and Justice.
92
 Specifically, this involved 
aligning the party more closely with the liberal-left cultural and media establishment; with 
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whom Civic Platform had, on occasions, had a rather uneasy relationship.
93
 In other words, as 
discussed above, in the 2007-11 parliament the party adopted a deliberate strategy of diluting 
its profile in pursuit of electoral success and dominance and increasingly became a non-
ideological (‘post-political’ to use the Polish term) ‘party of power’. However, while Civic 
Platform’s ability to garner the support of broad swathes of the electorate in opposition to a 
polarising challenger clearly provided it with an extremely effective short-term election-
winning strategy, this success was conjunctural. It also moved the party away from 
developing the kind of integrative ideological underpinning that would have provided it with 
a firmer basis for more enduring, long-term organisational stability. In other words, Civic 
Platform began to lose its sense of common purpose and mission as it developed into an 
(arguably) unfeasibly broad political construct making it more vulnerable to implosion if it 
faced a serious internal crisis. 
 
At one point Law and Justice’s ‘Fourth Republic’ project of wide ranging moral and political 
renewal did potentially appear to provide the party with just such an integrative ideological 
narrative. For sure, as noted above, the ‘Fourth Republic’ project developed extremely 
negative connotations and came to be used increasingly as a tool for mobilising those Polish 
voters who found Mr Kaczyński’s party too confrontational. Nonetheless, however distorted 
and cynical its critics might have argued that it was, it did represent a fairly serious attempt to 
develop a powerful and coherent conservative-national project. However, the party proceeded 
to abandon the ‘Fourth Republic’ narrative - for example, by downplaying issues such as 
crime, corruption and the need for moral and political renewal in the 2011 election 
campaign
94
 - which may have been justified on short-term electoral-strategic grounds, but 
risked damaging its longer-term cohesion and purposiveness. 
 
At one point, it appeared that Law and Justice was trying to use the emotions surrounding the 
Smolensk tragedy, and concomitant portrayal of the late President Kaczyński as a national 
martyr, as a new ‘mobilising myth’ that could provide bind its supporters closer to the 
party.
95
 This may have been effective as a means of mobilising the party’s core electorate, 
and potentially even enough to secure election victory on the basis of low turnout. However, 
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ultimately it was not enough to either provide the basis for short-term electoral success nor, 
given that its effectiveness was sure to fade with time, act as a substitute integrative narrative 
capable of helping the party secure its longer-term survival. The danger for Law and Justice 
as it faced the difficult challenges of party renewal and coping with successive electoral 
defeats, which often trigger centrifugal forces within parties, was that it would transmogrify 
into a vehicle for its guru-like leader. For sure, Mr Kaczyński was a charismatic figure who 
generated an extremely loyal following on the Polish right, it was difficult to envisage the 
party’s survival without him at its head, and even appeared impossible to build a successful 
right-wing formation in Poland that was not based on his leadership. However, except for the 
brief, exceptional period immediately after the Smolensk tragedy, he was also one of the 
country’s least trusted and most un-popular politicians. The 2011 election appeared to 
confirm that Mr Kaczyński was a politician who had reached the limits of his electoral and 
political potential and thereby made his party un-electable.
96
 
 
The electoral success of the Palikot Movement, the other major development in this election, 
together with the dismal showing of Poland’s establishment left party, the Democratic Left 
Alliance, brings us to the second set of issues regarding the long-term trajectory of Polish 
politics, namely: what kind of left would emerge in Poland and what role would these two 
groupings play would play in shaping its future? One the face of it, the Palikot Movement 
appeared to have identified and mobilised a new electorate among younger voters for whom 
the established parties were too timid and conservative on social issues. In fact, religion 
played a powerful role in shaping political views and structuring the political scene in post-
1989 Poland
97
 and there was always a radical anti-clerical electorate. Indeed, in many ways, 
it was attitudes towards moral-cultural issues and the role of the Catholic Church in public 
life that defined the core electorates of the secular left and religious right. The latter had been 
a key element of right-wing electoral blocs such as Law and Justice, and earlier the Solidarity 
Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS) conglomerate, and provided the main 
base of support for clerical-nationalist parties such as the Christian National Union 
(Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe: ZChN) in the 1990s and the League of Polish 
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Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin: LPR) in the 2000s. The anti-clerical electorate, on the other 
hand, was garnered by the Democratic Left Alliance, for whom a commitment to a secular 
state was, in rhetorical terms at least, one of the party’s signature issues. Indeed, as noted 
above, Mr Napieralski had actually focused quite heavily on this issue during the first phase 
of his leadership when he tried to portray himself as the ‘Polish Zapatero’. 
 
However, in practice the Democratic Left Alliance leadership was often prepared to 
compromise with the Catholic Church hierarchy, particularly when in government, and 
adopted a fairly pragmatic approach towards moral-cultural issues more generally. This was 
partly in order to achieve other objectives, such as ensuring that the Church maintained at 
least a neutral stance during the Polish EU accession process, and because radical anti-
clericalism on its own was not an election winning formula and felt to be a politically risky 
stance for a party that was trying to project a moderate self-image.
98
 But it was also because 
the Democratic Left Alliance leadership did not want to alienate less well-off economically 
leftist voters who were either not interested in social liberalism or actually quite culturally 
conservative; and there were many of these even among those who were not particularly 
religious and felt that the Catholic Church played too prominent a role in public life.
99
 
 
Mr Palikot - who, until the final stages of the campaign, looked like his project to build a 
political formation based primarily on an appeal to anti-clericalism was heading for failure
100
 
- was, in one sense, therefore simply able to garner and mobilise this existing electorate with 
a carefully targeted and intelligently executed campaign which focused on exploiting the 
weakness and disillusion on this issue among a segment of Democratic Left Alliance and 
Civic Platform voters. Part of Mr Palikot’s appeal was thus his ability to articulate some of 
the Democratic Left Alliance’s traditional themes but with much greater determination and 
energy (indeed, arguably aggression) than Mr Napieralski’s party. However, what was really 
different about the Palikot Movement’s appeal was the way that it combined this anti-clerical 
message with hostility to the political establishment, very explicit social liberalism expressed 
in support for sexual minorities and toleration of ‘soft’ drugs, together with business-friendly 
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economic liberalism and support for a ‘leaner’ state.101 All of this was pulled together into an 
over-arching electoral appeal based on a kind of ‘libertarian modernisation’ and 
communicated using a language and campaigning style particularly attractive to younger 
voters. On its own, this was not an election winning formula but it was a genuinely new 
phenomenon in Polish politics and a potentially significant enough constituency to provide 
the basis for a moderately successful political party.
102
 
 
However, given Mr Palikot’s poor record as a parliamentarian103 and the fact most of the new 
deputies that he brought into parliament had no political experience,
104
 the longer term 
electoral (and even organisational survival) prospects for his Movement were not necessarily 
all optimistic ones. Some of his new MPs were controversial figures and potentially quite off-
putting to more moderate voters if they received greater exposure
105
 while, other less 
ideologically committed ones, particularly among the generally pragmatic local entrepreneurs 
who were elected on the party’s electoral lists, could be tempted to defect to Civic Platform 
as the perceived ‘party of power’. Moreover, it was difficult to see a party with such a 
strongly pro-business outlook and committed to small-government flat-tax economic 
liberalism re-inventing itself convincingly enough to broaden its appeal to less well-off 
voters.
106
 At the same time, although the Democratic Left Alliance’s dismal showing clearly 
raised serious questions about whether it could remain a force in Polish politics it was too 
early to write off a party that retained a residual (although some would argue vestigial) ‘core’ 
of supporters including, as Table 3 shows, 58,500 paid up members
107
 and around 1,000 local 
councillors.
108
 This, together with the Palikot Movement’s potential structural weaknesses 
and the limitations of its appeal, meant that, although the Alliance entered a period of crisis 
(possibly even an existential one), it was not inconceivable that it, or a party formed on its 
basis, would re-emerge as the major force on the Polish left.  
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Conclusion 
 
The key to the Civic Platform’s victory in the 2011 election was, therefore, its ability to 
generate fear about the possible consequences of Law and Justice returning to power. 
Although many of the party’s supporters were disappointed with its slow progress in 
modernising the country, most voters clearly viewed Civic Platform as the better guarantor of 
stability at a time of crisis and continued to harbour deeply ingrained concerns about the main 
opposition party. Memories of Mr Kaczyński’s previous period in office were evidently still 
fresh enough to mobilise these disillusioned Civic Platform voters. In the event, enough Civic 
Platform supporters came out to vote to give Mr Tusk’s party its historically unprecedented 
second victory by a very clear margin. If the 2007 election was a referendum on the out-
going Law and Justice government then the 2011 poll turned into one on whether the main 
opposition party offered a credible alternative to Mr Tusk’s administration, and most voters 
felt that it did not. 
 
The election also appeared to provide further evidence of the consolidation and stabilisation 
of the Polish party system around the Civic Platform-Law and Justice divide. These two 
groupings confirmed their positions as the largest parties and attempts to develop an 
alternative to their duopoly on the centre-right once again ended in failure. However, other 
factors pointed to the dangers of declaring that the Polish party system was ‘frozen’ around 
these large political blocs and suggested that it remained vulnerable to further shocks and re-
alignments. The ‘ideological glue’ holding the two big parties together was much weaker 
than appeared on the surface. Polish election turnout remained extremely low by European 
standards and this, together with the weak nature of the links between parties and their 
supporters, meant that the electorate remained ‘open’ and available to potential challenger 
parties. Indeed, the breakthrough of the Palikot Movement showed how such a challenge 
could emerge regardless of the fact that the state party funding regime discriminated in favour 
of the existing larger parties. 
 
Mr Palikot’s electoral success was due partly to his ability to simply mobilise an existing 
anti-clerical electorate through a carefully targeted and intelligently executed campaign. 
However, he combined this message with a broader appeal based on hostility to the political 
establishment, very explicit social liberalism, and support for a business-friendly ‘leaner’ 
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state, and used a language and campaigning style that was particularly attractive to younger 
voters. This was not an election winning formula but it was a genuinely new phenomenon in 
Polish politics and potentially a significant enough constituency to provide a social base for a 
moderately successful political party. However, the Palikot Movement’s potential structural 
weaknesses and the limitations of its appeal meant it was questionable whether this new party 
would be the long-term beneficiary of any revival on the Polish left. 
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